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THE MICRO-POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF GAINS BY UNORGANISED 
WORKERS IN INDIA’S INFORMAL ECONOMY  
 
Barbara Harriss-White with Valentina Prosperi 
 
  
 
Granted that the era of globalised capital has not vanquished poverty or secured 
decent work conditions for the vast mass of workers1 the ‘perverse’ question for 
this essay is how un-unionised workers in the unorganised or informal economy 
improve their wages and other aspects of the terms and conditions of work.  
Our starting point is that India’s informal economy is the actually existing form 
taken by contemporary capitalism. Informal work is not residual, it is the 
commonest kind; it is not the reserve army or a separate ‘needs economy’ with a 
non-accumulative logic,2 it is the real economy, it does not consist of ‘invisible 
others’3 – in (non-metropolitan) India it is impossible to avoid; nor are its actors 
forgotten - it is not so much marginalised by the state as it is the object of a 
mass of inadequate regulative interventions with incoherent and contradictory 
purposes.4 So far, the 21st century has been marked by increasing 
informalisation, by serious and extensive deficits in decent work5 and by 
growing shares of the work force excluded from accumulation of any sort by 
relations of exploitation and/or exchange.6 Despite the growth of rights-based 
politics, formal access to social protection has atrophied7, income instability has 
flourished alongside an expansion of casual labour and distress-induced self-
employment without access to any work rights – all indicators of deteriorating 
vulnerability at work. The first 21st century decade has also witnessed the 
                                                          
1 Hensman, 2010 
2 See Jan’s critique of Sanyal, 2007: Jan, 2012 
3 Chakrabarti et al , 2008 
4 Harriss-White, 2012 
5 Kantor  et al, 2006 
6 Harriss-White, 2012  
7 Sharma and Arora, no date 
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sporadic forced entry and participation of women engaged in smoothing and 
supplementing their incomes.8  
The political response to this vulnerability is widely taken to be the mobilisation 
and organisation of informal workers.9 Yet most labour experts reason that 
formal or organised labour is weak (evinced by a reduction in industrial disputes 
and the growing incidence of disputes confined to individual companies) that 
organised labour is unable to expand as a workers’ movement and that the 
working class ‘in itself’ is unable to act as a class ‘for itself’. In the informal 
economy, types of contract (regular versus casual) labour processes 
(subcontracting, outsourcing and homeworking), social stratification  and 
discrimination (by locality, caste, ethnicity, religion, gender, age and health 
status) do not only structure the informal economy10 and differentiate returns to 
work, but they also make it extremely difficult to organise workers. Further, 
what Gooptu (2009) terms an individualistic ‘enterprise culture’ is seeping 
progressively into production relations in all sectors, further sapping collective 
political strength. For the vast mass of workers, the most that the literature 
acknowledges is acts of ‘everyday’ or ‘silent resistance’ for example through 
squatting for home plots11 – often distinguishing the politics of poverty outside 
work from the politics of work itself, while workers see such acts as a seamless 
part of their life-world.12 In the work place there are a few noted cases of the 
informal organisation of workers by sector and site (e.g. in the construction 
sector, coastal fishing and beedi wrapping) together with SEWA’s achievement 
in organising 1 million self-employed women.13 Even then, the point is often 
made that ‘informally organised’ workers struggle for welfare rights rather than 
work rights and against the state rather than against employers. 14 
Yet of late, in particular since the round of NSSO data gathering in 2005, wages 
for both regular and casual employment in the informal economy and real 
wages (adjusted for price inflation) appear to have bottomed out and started to 
                                                          
8 Corbridge, Harriss and Jeffrey, forthcoming 
9 see Bhalla, 1999  
10 The informal economy is termed ‘unorganised’ in India but it would be incorrect to argue that it is eith4r 
chaotic or disorganised – quite the opposite (Harriss-White, 2003). 
11 In the case of Dharavi slum, in Mumbai, see Mukhija, 2003 
12 Gooptu, 2001 
13 Jhabvala and Subramaniam, 2000 
14 see Vijayabaskar, 2011;Lerche, 2010  
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increase, though until recently and through most of India their growth rates 
were far below the rate of growth of GDP.15  
Between 2005-10, the number of openly unemployed people declined;16 real 
‘All-India’ average wages for casual agricultural labour were on an upward 
trend17; those of women increasing by 14.6 % in real terms and men at 7% 
between 2005-10.18 And, with expenditure regarded as a more reliable indicator 
of poverty than income, the consumption expenditure of the bottom quintile 
(20%) was also found to have increased over this period.19 When inflation is 
high and rising, then nominal rates of wage increases will appear to be dramatic. 
While the distributive share between wages and profit continues to be adverse to 
labour20 and while the All India average is known to hide significant regional 
differences in levels and trends, the paradox of increasing vulnerability 
alongside increasing real wages prompts us to seek to understand how 
vulnerable, un-unionised workers make gains at work in the informal 
economy.  
The question is not confined to academic interest but is of some practical 
relevance to labour organisations, possibly to employers and certainly to 
informal workers themselves. 
Method: Beyond the abstractions of labour supply facing greater demand, 
however, and beyond the impact of state interventions on raising the reservation 
floor for wages, there is no theory, even of an institutional kind, to guide the 
search for answers. We therefore examine these conventional approaches first; 
and then turn to summarise a scoping review of the Indian literature on the 
political economy, institutions and practices of informal labour gains.21 
 
Macro-level explanations of gains by informal labour:   
                                                          
15 Chakravarty, 2011; Kar 2011; Gulati and Jena, 2012   
16 Ray, 2011 
17  According to the NCEUS, 2008, they had increased from Rs 34 per day in 1993-4 to Rs 43in 2004-5. 
18 Gulati and Jena , 2012 
19 Nathan and Sarkar, 2012. It has subsequently dipped to a 7 year low in 2012 
http://india.nydailynews.com/newsarticle/50215dbbc3d4ca5129000005/india-consumer-spending-
weakest-in-seven-years-as-slowdown-bites 
20 Allirajan,2013 
21 See Prosperi, 2010 and forthcoming for analyses in the construction industry, garments and 
textiles, food processing and agriculture.. 
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1. Markets: demand for labour. Where the non-farm economy has flourished (as 
in Northern Tamil Nadu)22 and/or sectors are booming (notably in construction 
throughout India)23 and /or demand for specific skills rises (e.g.in the handloom 
silk industry in South India),24 and where transport and communications 
infrastructure has reduced the transactions costs of work and widened local 
fields of labour supply through commuting, 25 real wage gains to labour have 
been recorded. But the literature is content to stay at the level of description; it 
does not account for the means whereby these real wage increases have been 
gained. 
2. The state and supply. While the ILO caught the world’s attention by 
developing the concept of Decent Work – involving rights to work, at work, to 
labour organisation (or ‘dialogue’) and to social security, far less attention has 
been paid to forms of political mobilisation which could actually secure Decent 
Work rights. In India in late 2005 a significant concession was secured through 
an employment guarantee that grants 100 days of work (in practice about half 
that) to all self-selected work-seekers at levels of pay at or above the local 
minimum wage.26 If confined to the rural slack season this intervention has 
income smoothing effects. When clashing with peak agricultural demand, by 
being an alternative it has the potential to set a wage floor. There is sharp and 
inconclusive debate over the varied local effects of the employment guarantee. 
At less than 1 % GDP it can hardly drive national wage-rate gains. Gaiha  
records supportive effects on slack season agricultural wages.27 In three states of 
India studied by Reddy and  Upendranadh (2009) there was significant female 
participation on the NREGA when due process was fair and ‘minimum wages’ 
on the scheme exceeded agricultural wages.28 In rural Tamil Nadu, Heyer has 
observed employers’ willingness to follow the rises in NREGA rates under 
conditions when not matching NREGA pay affects the supply of labour.29 
The employment guarantee can be seen as a component of a slowly emerging 
and fragile welfare state. The PDS is the oldest and central element of this 
bundle of policies – developing from 1965 and actually strengthening its 
                                                          
22 Harriss-White  and Janakarajan, 2004 
23 Prosperi , forthcoming 
24 Roman, 2008 
25 Carswell and de Neve 2013 
26 Reddy and Upendranadh, 2009 
27 Gaiha , 1997 
28 Reddy et al, 2010  
29 Judith Heyer, Pers Comm, 2012 
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performance in the current era - amid criticism and proposals for alternatives.30  
A national social assistance programme was put before parliament in 1995.31 
Social security bills for informal workers were placed in the Lok Sabha 
(Parliament) in 2008; a (much debated) food security bill in 2012 and there is 
expert as well as public mobilisation for wide reforms to health and education. 
Threatened by the policy turn towards cash transfers and vulnerable to the 
health of the budget, this skeletal welfare state aims to improve conditions 
outside work and compensate those incapable of working.  
Its impact on wages and working conditions in the informal economy is thought 
to be traced indirectly - first through expanding the capacity of workers to 
withdraw from the most degrading and oppressive conditions of work to devote 
time to other aspects of domestic work, to themselves, child-care 32 or 
education33 and second through notable improvements in the respect paid to 
labour through the language and idioms of work.34 At the same time, in failing 
to address work conditions and focussing on welfare outside work, this suite of 
interventions does nothing if not legitimate informal labour. One hypothesis 
needing further exploration across the federation of Indian states is that the 
extent to which the state assumes the role of patron and develops a welfare state 
is related positively to gains in informal sector wages. 35 
These state welfare rights are being secured in a vulnerable and drawn-out 
process involving civil society movements and academic activism together with 
left party pressure whenever this is politically possible. They have not been 
secured directly by informal workers themselves. And both the political and the 
analytical framing of gains is confined to the wage level – no other aspect of 
work is well addressed.  
So the macro-level literature shows that the question of the tactics and 
institutions through which gains are secured belongs to the category of a 
general question that requires micro-level and detailed, context-rich research 
for its answers. 
                                                          
30 Khere, 2011 
31 Justino, 2003 
32 Heyer, 2011, a and b 
33 V Prosperi, forthcoming. 
34 Judith Heyer, Personal Communication, 2012 
35 Harriss-White, 2010, reviewed literature to argue the reverse however – that even in the informal 
economy, work status had a major impact on access to social security. 
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Micro level explanations: Moving beyond descriptions of levels and trends, 
demand and supply, we first examine explanations involving action by 
employers before turning to employees. 
Employers 
1.Trusteeship – Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Pressurised by 
campaigns on the part of consumers and civil society representatives, highly 
selective and limited improvements in labour standards have been imposed on 
informal producers by registered global companies under ‘CSR’ (Ruthven, 
2008). Case studies document elaborate evasive tactics as well as strategically 
selective success.36 In the case of IKEA for example, gains have been made in 
health and safety and in environmental standards. But the IKEA work-forces’ 
own demands reflect different priorities (e.g. lack of over-time pay and 
undercutting by contract labour) and these have not been addressed under CSR. 
Rights to organise have not been honoured, nor has social discrimination in the 
workplace been countered.37 
2.Commodity Price Trends. In the agricultural sector, higher agricultural 
product prices, when not matched by higher bio-chemo-mechanical inputs 
prices, have been found to enable higher agricultural wages to be conceded,  
irrespective of the effects of the Employment Guarantee Scheme and the real 
wage effects on net consumers.38 
3.New technologies. Where a new technology enhances net labour demand (as 
has happened in the case of Bt cotton), other things being equal, agricultural 
wages have also been found to have risen. 39 
4.Patronage and Paternalism; the Roles of Labour Contractors and Gang-
masters. Increasingly daily wages are being replaced by piece rates and, though 
the practice is still not widespread, farmers’ own searches for labour are being 
outsourced to labour contractors. There is a growing literature on the hold of 
contractors over agricultural –especially migrant – labour40 but labour 
contractors are now spreading through the informal economy. In a case from the 
                                                          
36 Samy and Vijayabaskar, 2006 
37 Prosperi , 2010;  forthcoming 
38 Rao, 2011 
39 Subramaniam and Qaim, 2010 
40 See Breman et al, 2009 
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construction industry, Prosperi found contractors able to discriminate in wages 
between individual gang members, based on personal relations of loyalty, 
reliability and trust. With power to divide the work force, they may concede 
gains to individuals at the expense of the collective. Some gang labour has been 
found to be seasonally bonded. Gang-masters may also organise housing, food, 
health care and communication for groups of migrant labour, though this is 
certainly not a common occurrence.41 The extent to which they mediate claims 
with employers on behalf of labour awaits a dedicated study of contractors. 
The body of evidence about employers’ actions invokes cause and effect, 
mostly by inference. Gains to labour are not conceived as a micro-political 
struggle.  
Employees: 
1.Assets and the Role of Self Employment. In a closely observed case study of 
women’s work in rural Andhra Pradesh, Garikipati shows that the ownership of 
assets relates to stronger bargaining power. She argues that this results from 
self-employment’s being an alternative to wage work. Indeed experts on labour 
often see self-employment as ‘good quality work’ 42 since the distribution of 
earnings from self-employment has a higher and longer right-handed tail than 
that from wage work and since ‘autonomy’ is found to be a valued attribute of 
work.43 The ‘shift to self-employment’ is conceived as a gain in work quality 
rather than as a form of production or trade generating an opportunity to 
accumulate.  
In fact, while it is true that self-employment is now the commonest form of 
work in India accounting for 53% of the workforce,44 much evidence shows it to 
be propelled by the compulsions of poverty rather than entrepreneurial 
prospects for accumulation. Self-employment may be understood as self-
exploitation, or undertaken part-time or in slack seasonal employment troughs. 
Or it is the preserve of women returned to home working after a period (1999-
                                                          
41 Harriss-White, 2010; Picherit, 2009 
42 Sundaram, 2007  
43 ,Ruthven, 2008; see also Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2007 
44 This is driven by the agricultural sector and varies greatly within the non-agricultural economy. See 
references in Harriss-White,  2012 
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2005 judging by the labour statistics) spent in wage work as a result of 
agricultural distress.45  
It is a matter of some importance that self-employment is classified by labour 
economists and lawyers alike as ‘disguised wage labour’ because with no 
consensus on its terminology, self-employment/petty production/own account 
enterprise/ micro-enterprise/cottage industry/ the tiny sector etc is consensually 
interpreted as a positive shift in the terms, conditions and returns to labour.  
 
In fact, there is a continuum of forms of self-employment from hardly disguised 
wage work to complete autonomy. Its distinctiveness takes several forms: first, 
while labour is exploited on labour markets , self-employed workers can be 
exploited on (rental) markets for property, raw materials , money and finished 
products – they may shift the balance of power towards them in exchange 
relations on four markets (contracts may shift adversely too). Second, self-
employed people can operate a distinctive logic of super-exploitation or super-
efficiency in which production is maximised rather than (marginal) productivity 
(in which improvements would be indicated, perversely, by reductions in 
production). Third, exchange relations contrive to prevent accumulation and 
self-employment expands instead by multiplication; so the question  whether an 
expansion in self-employment is an indication of social gains to labour or rather 
a signal of the power of relations preventing accumulation (or both) is an open 
one. Fourth, self-employed workers are disenfranchised in labour law when they 
cannot identify a single employer against whom to bring a grievance to court 
(the multiple exchange relations in which the self-employed are entangled 
making this impossible).  
The possession of assets may make it possible to bargain higher wages, but the 
turn to self-employment is not a solid indicator of gains by labour. 
2.Long Term Loyalty: Case material demonstrates that, despite contractual 
precarity, wages may increase with the length of ‘service’ with a given 
employer.46 One the one hand this may be a customary norm; on the other it 
may reflect individual skill and experience. Gains are slow and individualised. 
                                                          
4545 Corbridge, Harriss and Jeffrey, forthcoming 
46 Prosperi, 2010; forthcoming; Harriss, 1981; Harriss-White 1996 
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Employers may also seek to bind long term informal employees without written 
contracts who they desire to retain, using loans.  
3.Deployment of Collective Identities: In village studies in Tamil Nadu47 
networks and social relations among agricultural labour based upon kinship, 
friendship and caste are described as being deployed to raise wages and improve 
conditions. Unorganised labour may also organise itself by village of origin and 
locality (where it can restrict entry, operate a closed shop, and negotiate 
periodically and in the collective interest against a set of employers).48 Research 
in Haryana demonstrates that collective identity may be as much a structure of 
control as it is one of enabling and empowerment.49 How localised the  gains 
achieved by the mobilisation of social identities are  - and whether they are 
made at the expense of other groups of workers – has not been established. The 
dynamics of such processes have mainly been researched in the context of 
migration. 
4.Migration. Migrant labour appears to bring mixed effects on labour markets. 
On the one hand, an increase in the supply of (compliant) labour threatens 
employment opportunities as well as wages of workers in the destination sector 
and site – worse for women than for men and worse for older rather than 
younger workers. On the other hand migrant labour often manages to improve 
wages over and above rates in the origin.50 The effects of migration on migrants 
themselves are far from homogeneous. They may involve bondage or they may 
include social liberation, especially for oppressed dalit labour.51 Migration is 
also structured through institutions of caste, gender, locality, kinship and 
friendship but the literature suggests that while these relationships are vital in 
recruitment per se, their effectiveness in bettering work conditions is not well 
researched or established. As with the case of individualised relations with 
contractors so here with entire groups of migrants, low wages may be accepted 
in the interest of stable work opportunities. There is little evidence of migrants 
themselves attempting to improve work conditions. One case of informal labour 
                                                          
47  Ramachandran et al 2001 
48 E.g. marketplace porters in the town of Arni, South India: source  - author’s field interviews, 2012. 
49 Rawal, 2006 
50 Picherit, 2009  and Pattenden, 2012 
51 Rogaly and Coppard 2003 
 10 
 
mobilisation observed by Prosperi was a frustrated reaction to non- and 
extremely delayed payment of wages.52 
5.Shifts in sector./ location. Net of migration, other shifts may result in better 
working conditions. Moves from agriculture to the rural or local non-farm 
economy, and from rural to urban work are clearly associated with increased 
earnings.53 So much so that the local urban non-farm economy may become a 
redoubt – barring women and low caste aspirants.54 
 
Conclusions:  
While India’s informal economy provides evidence of on-going vulnerability, 
there is recent evidence for real wage gains. Yet the question of the micro-
political practices by means of which gains in wages and improvements in 
working conditions are achieved by un-unionised, un-organised labour in the 
informal economy is one that does not seem to have been researched explicitly. 
It is also a general question whose answers have to be sought at the micro level.  
The literature of case material is exiguous. Time series or historical evidence 
hardly exists and the trend of All-India real gains appears to be too recent for 
research cycles to have been completed. To date answers have to be found 
between the lines of research which has other objectives. Much of the existing 
evidence associates certain economic conditions with certain labour-market 
outcomes inferring cause and effect. Even literature rich in the details of 
working conditions (in agriculture in particular) ignores the question of the 
tactics used to struggle for wage gains or for changes in non-monetary gains, 
such as respect. 
Little is known substantively. Relations of clientelism or loyalty may bring 
gains to individuals. The existence of alternative work at higher rates (state-
supplied / self-employment/ different sectors / different locations) with the 
option of not working, or not working as many days may force employers to 
raise wages. They then start to worry about the timing of labour supply - they 
                                                          
52 Prosperi ,2010 
53 Jayaraj 2004; Jha nd 
54 Haggblade et al 2010 
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may try to treat labour better - ‘like a bride’55 - not only offering higher 
wages.But not enough is known about how they resist or capitulate.  
 
Labour may organise for objectives outside work – conditioning their life-world 
and their reproductive space – when mobilising to improve conditions at work is 
currently faced with insuperable obstacles. Collective identities may be 
deployed in the search for work but are rarely recorded as the basis for struggles 
for improved conditions. If non market forms of exchange, co-ownership, 
solidary institutions, co-operative and collective practices of labour protection 
such as those explored elsewhere in this book play roles in the securing of gains 
to men and women workers, they are not yet identified and recorded. 
 
For a wide constituency of public interests, and since there is no sign of 
anything other than further informalisation, systematic research is needed into 
the means whereby informal labour reduces its vulnerabilities and achieves 
improvements in its working conditions. 
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